Beyond Accommodation: The Legacy of Feminist Critique and the Search for Justice by Johnson, Toni A.M.
feminists@law  Vol 1, No 1 (2011) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1 
 
Beyond Accommodation: The legacy of feminist critique and the 
search for justice 
 
Toni A.M. Johnson
*
 
 
 
 
In this short reflection on Drucilla Cornell’s work, I focus on the journey that her 
search for both a symbolic and substantive form of justice has taken and the influence 
that her particular conception of justice has had on my own work. Beginning with her 
analysis in Beyond Accommodation (1991) and its theoretical debt to postmodernism, 
I indicate the legacy that this postmodern reliance has in relation to her later works, 
The Imaginary Domain (1995) and At the Heart of Freedom (1998).
1
 These later 
works, flagged as a theoretical departure from the postmodern critique that informed 
Beyond Accommodation, chart Cornell’s move towards liberalism.  This brief analysis 
of her journey seeks to highlight three things. Firstly, that the insights of 
deconstruction are still prevalent in these later, more liberally-informed analyses. 
Secondly, Cornell’s shift towards liberalism nevertheless pursues similar questions, 
concerns and conversations to those posed in her earlier writing. Thirdly, in taking 
those conversations in new directions, Cornell has created a legacy of analysis that 
traverses methodological and theoretical boundaries. I claim it is Cornell’s attempts to 
rethink the possibilities of justice that inspire her to engage with multiple theoretical 
and methodological traditions in order to rethink legal futures; it is these legal futures 
which bear purchase for my own engagement with her work, chiefly her concept of 
the ‘imaginary domain’.  
 
Cornell as a ‘thinker of the future’2 
Cornell’s explicit reliance on, and productive relationship with, Derrida’s notion of 
différance and Levinas’s ethical responsibility to the Other in Beyond Accommodation 
has contributed to her unique form of postmodern feminist engagement. In Beyond 
Accommodation these theoretical foundations were put to use via critiques of certain 
strands of feminist analyses of gender equality, namely the work of Catharine 
MacKinnon, Robin West and to a more muted degree Julia Kristeva and Luce 
Irigaray.
3
  Cornell’s concern lay with the essentialist nature of these critiques and the 
effect that such essentialism had in its exclusivity and oppression of other actors.  
Cornell’s analysis also extended to a broader critique of law and justice, thinking 
beyond the possibilities of the current system and delving into the place of myth and 
metaphor in the reinscription, rewriting and re-evaluation of the feminine.
4
 The 
political project that resonated and continues to resonate throughout Cornell’s works 
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is a search for an understanding of sexuate freedom and a corresponding 
conceptualisation of justice.
5
   
 
Throughout her works Cornell posits justice as an ideal, as aspiration, as inherently 
elusive and always ‘to come’. The nature of Cornell’s exploration ties these 
‘possibilities’ of justice to questions of judging and judgment, to equality and the law, 
to the impact of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, to the place of women in the 
symbolic as compared to the imaginary and to the nature and composition of 
language.  The critical response and critical reflections on language found in 
deconstruction have informed her political position and profoundly influenced her 
revisionary legal projects.
6
  
 
For Cornell language is far from neutral. It is influenced by and invested in multiple 
cultural and contextual referents.
7
  Furthermore, language perpetuates new cycles of 
meaning, whereby meaning is neither static nor containable.  As Susan Williams has 
written, ‘language is a social artifact, created, in part by the language we use to 
describe it…the interpretation that is an inevitable aspect of knowledge formation is 
deeply permeated by the cultural values and concepts encoded in the language 
through which that knowledge is expressed’.8 When this system of language 
production is viewed in the context of the legal system it becomes apparent that the 
linguistic system upon which law rests, a system that brings us influential definitions 
of ‘justice’, ‘liberty’, and ‘equality’, is deeply invested and entrenched in the 
linguistic precedents, histories and contexts via which meaning is given. Thus, the 
possibility of the legal system providing a way of contesting ‘encoded’ language 
would seem, if not impossible, certainly challenging.
9
  
 
In Beyond Accommodation, Cornell takes up this challenge by addressing this 
linguistic bind.  Drawing on Derrida, Lacan and Levinas, she explores the nature and 
language of law. She considers the way the legal system has both gained and 
continues to gain from and function via that empowered status through the oppression 
and exclusion of alterity/the Other. Cornell specifically addresses the position of 
women’s engagement with law and language, considering how it constructs women, 
and the social violence that is caused by the linguistic exclusivity of those 
constructions.   Cornell’s turn to deconstruction is an exploration of the way in which 
women are positioned within language and consequently within law. It is her intent to 
deconstruct the linguistic foundations of that order and acknowledge the necessity of 
exposing that order if any notion of justice or ethical response to the Other is to bear 
legitimacy. 
  
Cornell’s call to deconstruct gender, as part of a response to engaging with justice in 
Beyond Accommodation, The Imaginary Domain and At The Heart of Freedom, 
continues to provide key insights for a radical and transformatory politics. Cornell 
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notes ‘it is time to deconstruct the gendered opposition that pervades western reason, 
and so to reinvent the model of the legal subject’. Cornell’s project in the Imaginary 
Domain and At the Heart of Freedom is an engaging attempt in how to manifest this 
new legal subject.
10
 The ‘imaginary domain’ is not just about addressing the position 
of women within the symbolic and within the imaginary. Cornell’s project is much 
wider in terms of the way in which it seeks to touch the very foundations of gender 
for both men and women and their status as bearing legal personhood. 
 
Cornell’s vision of an alternate legal system, as developed through the imaginary 
domain, feminism and deconstruction, provides a new way of thinking about 
personhood. She writes: 
 
Our emancipation from state-imposed sexual choices and from their 
reinforcement by the basic institutions of society demands much greater social 
equality than we have now…When all persons have this right to the imaginary 
domain, states can no longer force women to play the role of primary 
caretaker in families, either directly by law or indirectly by the manipulation 
of social institutions.
11
 
 
Cornell’s development of the ‘imaginary domain’, deployed as a psychological space 
in which to reimagine personal understandings of gender and sexuality, and bearing 
the protection of law, was a revolutionary reimagining of legal personhood. Within 
the conceptual framework of the ‘imaginary domain’, law is the social mechanism 
that protects the version of ‘private’ life envisaged by the individual. Law does not 
determine the form of the imaginary domain, but protects the individual’s right to it 
and the conditions in which that private life can be lived out. Furthermore, the 
conceptual framework of the imaginary domain has at its heart a concept of ‘freedom’ 
rather than formal equality. For Cornell, the freedom to orient ourselves as 
individuals, to create our own visions and versions of ‘the good life’, is at the heart of 
the imaginary domain.  Subsequently, the freedom to become a person is dependent 
on the minimum conditions of individuation; namely, the conditions necessary in 
order to ‘transform ourselves into the individuated beings we think of as persons’.12  
Cornell’s use of ‘freedom’ rather than ‘equality’ is part of a critique of formal 
equality provisions that she claims are based on an aspiration to particular positions of 
privilege. Cornell argues that these positions of privilege are normative and delimited 
constructs of identity that stifle the imaginary possibility of those who occupy them 
and those who wish to ascend to them.
13
  
 
The imaginary domain gives vision to new ways of thinking about intimate life and 
intimate futures.  For Cornell, the imaginary domain: 
 
allows the sexual imago in and through which we come to represent ourselves 
… it is the psychic space in which we are allowed to freely imagine ourselves 
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as sexuate beings, representing ourselves as persons who define our own 
moral perspectives in matters of sex, love and intergenerational friendship … 
It allows for imagined modes of relationships that help us give body to the 
ways we wish to set up our intimate relationships.
14
 
  
The emphasis on the ability of individuals to shape their own lives outside of and 
unhindered by legislative constructs of appropriate familial formations encouraged me 
to take advantage of the theoretical premise of the imaginary domain in order to 
reconceptualise the position of lesbian and gay refugees and the contexts from which 
they had fled.  Relying on the freedom associated with the imaginary domain 
provided a theoretical site to rethink and reframe identity within the legal structure of 
the Refugee Convention. In lieu of taking a more radical position that would call for a 
practice of no border regulation and the rendering of law as moot, I instead relied on a 
new language of law. This reliance upon a new theory of legalism on which the right 
to legal personhood turned, a legal personhood that called for freedom rather than 
equality was intrinsically shaped by Cornell’s ‘imaginary domain’. 
 
Cornell’s version of intimate relationships has been significant for LGBT refugees, 
particularly in its engagement with and response to sexuality’s boundedness within 
nationalist politics and identity politics. Her version of ‘freedom’ is able to assert 
itself within these controlling structures, toying with the language of rights and 
deploying alternative definitions deeply influenced by Derridean understandings of 
the ‘slippage’ and ‘seepage’ inherent in language.   Cornell’s ‘right’ to ‘freedom’ is 
dependent upon a legal system that recognises the absolute agency and legal 
personhood of the individual, irrespective of their gender or sexuality. I argue that 
recognition of a specifically Cornellian version of legal personhood leads to an 
inviolable responsibility on the part of the UK asylum court. Social and state 
behaviours that preclude, discriminate against, or persecute non-normative intimate 
relationships/family forms, directly counter the ethos of the imaginary domain and 
would therefore establish eligibility for refugee status. Additionally, the imaginary 
domain I claim, troubles the Refugee Convention’s understanding of identity as fixed. 
The ‘imaginary domain’ would allow for a more open conceptualisation of the 
grounds of the Convention, providing an understanding of identity that does not 
function on the basis of immutability or the compartmentalization of identity traits, 
but on the indivisibility of gender, race, religion, class and how these facets are 
informed by context, by politics and by self-conceptualisation.  
 
Thus, The Imaginary Domain and At the Heart of Freedom are, in part, an analysis of 
the way in which law and politics gives legal weight and legal validity to particular, 
essentialised identities and the psychic impact this has on understandings of the 
legitimacy, worth and self-worth of individuals and their relationships. Law’s 
traditional denial of legitimacy to particular groups, namely women, people of colour, 
lesbians and gay men, or those in non-traditional relationships, can make individuals 
and others view their status and their relationships as inadequate or unworthy of 
respect.  These processes of inclusion and exclusion on a macro scale have an 
intimate effect on the microcosm of intimate familial/individual practices. Thus, the 
place of deconstruction and new formulations of law and legal personhood, such as 
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that found in the imaginary domain, become incredibly important in linking practices 
of acknowledgement, both legal and social, with the practice of developing an anti-
essentialist politics that does not seek to inscribe particular traits as bearing superior 
status or a status which would eclipse other facets of identity.  
 
Cornell’s legal reformist project of the imaginary domain, which has at its heart a 
desire to give individuals the freedom to ‘create ourselves as sexed beings, as feeling 
and reasoning persons’, provides a useful tool to both engage with law whilst at the 
same time trying to deconstruct the language that gives law its power.
15
 The 
imaginary domain gives individuals the space to conceptualise their optimum vision 
of private life and legally protects the practice of living out that life.   
 
Cornell’s feminism aligned with deconstruction’s breadth of openness to the Other, to 
language, and the ethical, underpins Cornell’s analysis and ensures that her work still 
sits at the cutting edge of a radical social transformatory philosophy. Cornell’s 
analysis refrains from any definitive conceptualisations or limitations placed on 
identity, with such impositions and assumptions viewed as a violent assertion. These 
tropes inform Beyond Accommodation, The Imaginary Domain and At the Heart of 
Freedom and underpin Cornell’s conception of law, which is informed by a feminist, 
ethical, postmodern analysis. Cornell is a thinker of the future. Her traversal of 
different theoretical traditions is an indication of the way in which she strives to 
develop new paths towards the interpretation of language, create new modes of 
understanding processes of inclusion and exclusion, and contest methods of 
categorisation. In searching for justice, Cornell looks to the possibilities of the future, 
the unbridled nature of that future, refusing to settle for the present.
16
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